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Development, Growth and Fragmentation of National Awami Party (NAP) (1957-1975): A Comparative Analysis of NAP (Bhashani) and NAP (Wali)

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Abstract

The paper examines the comparative analysis of the National Awami Party (NAP) two groups in Pakistan. NAP was one of the greatest powerful leftist parties, experienced a main split in the late 1960s, founding two groups: NAP–Bhashani and NAP–Wali. This article delivers a full comparative study of these groups, by investigating their ideological alignments, political plans, leadership panaches, and general impression on Pakistan's political scenery. NAP–Bhashani shadowed fundamental leftist positions and class struggle, while, NAP–Wali accepted a practical approach towards electoral politics mainly concentrating on parliamentary contribution and provincial autonomy. The study emphasis their political groups within national and international dynamics, providing visions into the trials and achievements of leftist politics in Pakistan.

Keywords: NAP, Bhashani, Wali, Political, Strategy, Development, Growth, Fragmentation.

1. Introduction:

In the late 1950s, as the National Awami Party (NAP) came into being, Pakistan was still dealing with the difficulties left behind by its colonial history and the challenges of having a population with many different groups. The Muslim League was present in the initial years of the country as the party had given the country independence in 1947. Leaders from the provinces were not listened to, opposition was squelched and there was little room for new ideas or differing opinions during this period. In such a context, NAP emerged as a voice for the voiceless such as farmers, workers and provincial leaders. The party's program was based on federalism, which would decentralize power from the central government to the states and regions, thereby allowing local policy to influence the policies made.

NAP also demanded that the provinces get more autonomy in managing their resources and things such as cultural issues, with Baluchistan and Sindh for instance being able to manage their affairs without the influence of the central government. These were not only a matter of re-engineering the government but also of challenging the concept of a single Pakistani identity that was devoid of consideration of the country's ethnic and language diversity. The National Awami Party (NAP) emerged in Pakistan as a liberal and leftist political party in the 1950s who were pro-regressive, pro-provincial, and pro-population rights. NAP became a forum for leftist intelligentsias, politicians, and campaigners to change the socio-political framework of Pakistan with their ideology. But because of ideological differences, local aspirations and leader differences, the NAP split into two factions: NAP – Bhashani led by Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani and NAP – Wali led by Khan Abdul Wali Khan.

This article draws a comparison between the two and maps out their ideologies, political strategies, leadership and their role in Pakistan's leftist political trajectory. The NAP was a conglomeration of different leftist socialist political leaders from both East and West Pakistan. In East Pakistan Maulana Hamid Khan Bhashani along with Yar. M. Khan and West Pakistan are written by Syed Kaswar Gardezi, Mahmud Ali Qasoori (Punjab), G.M. Syed, Abdul Majid Sindhi and Haider Bakhsh Jatoti (Sindh) and Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Hakeem. M. Aslam and Khan Abdul Wali Khan In NWFP, Abdul Samad Achakzai, Hashim Khan Ghilzai and Usman Gul in Baluchistan, respectively.

NAP's basis accorded with a retro of political confusion in Pakistan. The post-independence period was obvious by centralized domination, conquest of opposition, and political relegation of provincial leaders.¹ NAP wanted to test the supremacy of the Muslim League by supporting federalism, provincial autonomy, and social justice. The philosophical alignment of NAP was prejudiced by socialist values, peasant activities, and worldwide anti-imperialist flows, chiefly in the 1960s when Cold War dynamics formed national political positions.²

The split amongst Bhashani and Wali arose from both philosophical and local factors. Bhashani, functioning mainly in East Pakistan, was prejudiced by essential socialist believed and mass mobilization policies. Wali Khan, founded in the North-West Frontier Province, and Baluchistan highlighted political

¹ Imtiaz Ali, *Political Parties in Pakistan: Ideology and Organization* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1987), 112–15.

² Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 95–101.

practicality, parliamentary appointment, and associations with other democratic parties.³ The split reproduced different dreams of leftist politics: radical activism against incremental reforms over institutional politics.

NAP–Bhashani accepted a radical leftist ideology accenting anti-imperialism, socialism, and peasant rights. Bhashani's group allied with international socialist movements and quite often criticized Pakistan's central government and Western influence.⁴ The group's manifesto called for radical land reforms, nationalization of major industries, and authorization of rural communities. Bhashani's method drew stimulus from international socialist leaders and anti-colonial activities, aligning his group as an inflexible speech of the burdened.

In contrast, NAP–Wali endorsed a practical form of democratic socialism. Wali Khan absorbed on provincial autonomy, judicial reforms, and coalition-building within the legislative system.⁵ The group highlighted practical answers, such as better governance, managerial devolution, and solid policy consequences. While dedicated to socialist principles, NAP–Wali ordered possible improvements over mass mobilization, sparkly a strategic version to Pakistan's political situation.

NAP–Bhashani's approach placed on popular mobilization. He prepared peasants, workers, and rural communities through rallies, strikes, and campaigns, particularly in East Pakistan.⁶ The group's tactics frequently complicated anxiety and straight action to pressure the government into policy changes. Bhashani also cooperated with other leftist and anti-establishment activities, using protests as a device to upsurge discernibility and effect.

On the other hand, NAP–Wali followed parliamentary meeting and strategic alliances with other democratic parties. By contributing in elections, judicial processes, and alliances politics, Wali Khan required to advance the party's agenda through cooperation and negotiation.⁷ This policy permit NAP–Wali to improve provincial influence, predominantly in the North-West Frontier Province, and to influence strategies connected to provincial autonomy and social development.

2. Issues in the Disintegration of the National Awami Party (NAP)

The collapse of the National Awami Party (NAP) as a unified political party can be explained by analyzing a combination of various factors internal and external to the party. The party's internal organization and leadership dynamics were crucial, but external factors of the Cold War era had a tremendous impact on its internal alignment and factional behavior. After the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the USA and the UK began to develop a strong strategic relationship with India with the goal of establishing it as a regional counterweight in South Asia. This was accompanied by significant military aid from the West to India. All these changes were affecting the perception of President Ayub Khan about Pakistan's tilt towards the Western bloc and required a rethinking of Pakistan's foreign policy.

³ Abdul Wali Khan, *Path to Democracy: Political Memoirs of Wali Khan* (Peshawar: Frontier Publications, 1984), 67–72.

⁴ Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, *Peasant Struggles and Socialist Politics in Pakistan* (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1972), 41–46.

⁵ Ishtiaq Ahmed, *Pakistan: The Political Economy of Socialism and Democracy* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1995), 153–58.

⁶ Tariq Rahman, *Peasant Movements and Left Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 88–94.

⁷ Ali Riaz, *The Pakistani Left and Its Decline: Ideology, Leadership, and Strategy* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2010), 121–27.

As a reaction, Pakistan slowly started to normalize relations with the Soviet Union and signed valuable border treaties with the People's Republic of China. At the same time, the U.S. adopted a more conservative policy in providing military and economic aid to Pakistan. This was an opportunity for Pakistan to broaden its economic ties, especially in Africa and the Middle East. In this context, many efforts were undertaken such as Afro-Asian Solidarity Association. Maulana Abdul Hamid Bhashani and those who were following him in NAP basically welcomed these foreign policy changes and openly welcomed the reorientation by the government.⁸

3. Conceptual Discussions Inside the NAP

The foreign policy change led to a serious ideological conflict within the NAP between their leftist, and communist, factions over their attitude towards the Ayub regime. In the past many of them had been shaped by Bhashani's secular and anti-imperialist views. In the leftist camp three separate stances were formed, Abid Hasan Manto (as quoted by Iqbal Leghari) said, "The proponents of three positions." The first group said that since Ayub Khan's foreign policy has been changing, it was necessary that the leftist activists refrain themselves from any kind of united front with the rightist parties against the regime of Ayub Khan. A second group argued that domestic political issues should be considered above the international alignments, and that a wide coalition should be established that consists of right-wing parties in order to oust Ayub Khan based on a minimum programme. A third stance proposed was to condemn Ayub Khan's foreign policies and at the same time to give tacit approval to his domestic policies.⁹

The third position, however, was becoming more and more difficult in reality, due to the close relationship between the problems of domestic and foreign policy. Many of the leftist activists in both wings of the country realized what a double-faced Ayub regime was. Furthermore, Ayub Khan's land reform policies changed traditional attitudes towards land ownership and his industrial and economic policies helped earn him the favor of some social groups. In this context, personalities like Abid Hasan Manto, C. R. Aslam and Abdul Hamid Bhashani were labeled as being "politically soft" to the government by the factions of NAP.¹⁰

4. The Emergence of the Spirit of Factionalism in the NAP

In the course of time, clashes over the right political action in response to the Ayub regime grew and developed into organized factional divisions within the NAP. Political pragmatism and strategic calculations also influenced the differences, albeit in the context of ideological conflict. The group that always took a hard-liner stance against Ayub became linked to the pro-Moscow stance. In contrast, those who were more tolerant of the regime slowly became more pro-Beijing. In West Pakistan, another camp also developed that included opposition leaders like Shaukat Ali, Eric Cyprian, Muhammad Ishaq and Afzal Bangash who were also active in electoral mobilization against Ayub Khan. Such divides were also seen in party structures in the interior of Sindh as well as in Karachi.

⁸ Iqbal Leghari, "The Socialist Movement in Pakistan" (PhD diss., University of Oxford, 1979), 108.

⁹ Ibid, 109

¹⁰ Ibid, 110

The prominent figure in Sindh, speaking about an ideology of pro-China was Tufail Abbas. He rejected the position of Sindh Provincial Committee, saying that the regime of Ayub Khan was in the interest of bourgeois while at the same time he was to protect the feudal structure. He also argued that the man, Ayub Khan, could not be interpreted just as an agent of imperialism because Pakistan had signed an oil exploration contract with the Soviet Union and the border region between Pakistan and China. He refused to accept the Soviet approach to "peaceful transition to socialism" as a revisionist concept and embraced the Chinese revolutionary road.¹¹

Abbas became more influential as the pro-China element grew stronger among the students and younger members of the socialist movement, who were far more active and vocal. The internal division got further aggravated and in September 1964, Tufail Abbas was expelled from the Sindh Provincial Committee. Later, he created a separate West Pakistan committee to consolidate the party split even further.¹²

5. The Role of East Pakistan Dimension and Bhashani

In East Pakistan, Maulana Abdul Hamid Bhashani joined the pro-China political leaders like Muhammad Toha and Abdul Haq. At first his political leanings shifted after the Sino-Indian War of 1962 when Pakistan refused to follow the American pressure and developed closer ties with China. China was critical of Ayub Khan's military regime in the beginning, calling it 'reactionary', but the attitude changed after the war as the strategic considerations prompted closer Sino-Pakistan ties. As a result, Bhashani's party realigned its political approach and granted some tactical support to the government. There was a shift toward internal criticism of the regime, often directed at such matters as civil liberties, taxation policies, inflation, and rural grievances, as well as the Vietnam War. This was an ideology shift and a general rethinking of the foreign policy of Pakistan as a 'bilateralism' or a policy of engagement with both the western bloc and the socialist bloc. However, critics in the party insisted that this was a "dual policy" which lacked any sense of ideology and independence.¹³

In 1963 Maulana Bhashani was invited to visit China as the head of a delegation by the government of Ayub. Before leaving, he met President Ayub Khan in Rawalpindi which marked a temporary alignment of political interests. His trip to China further solidified the new ideological row within the NAP. On his visit, Bhashani met with the leaders of China, such as Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. At a time of shifting alliances in the region, the Chinese leadership stressed the importance of Pakistan-China relations and cautioned against hasty steps in opposing the Ayub government, diplomatic sources quoted by Tariq Ali say.¹⁴

It is a policy opposition and criticism to China's policies by the Pro-Moscow opposition. The pro-Moscow faction, headed by Wali Khan, on the other hand, condemned the current foreign policy moves of the Government and the increased tilt towards China. This group insisted that Pakistan's military and diplomatic policies were being driven by imperialist interests, and that the formation of the China-

¹¹ *Kharija Policy aur Syiasi Jama'at* (Lahore: Punjab National Awami Party, n.d.), 11.

¹² Anwar Hussain Syed, *China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974), 147

¹³ Tariq Ali, *Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power?* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), 140.

¹⁴ Khan Abdul Wali Khan, *Bacha Khan aw Khudai Khidmatgari*, vol. 2 (Peshawar: Bacha Khan Markaz, n.d.), 369.

Pakistan alliance was not a true anti-imperialist change. In the Indo-China War situation in 1962 the USA supported India and expected Pakistan's support in this way. But Pakistan's decision to not meet the expectations of the United States was a bad omen for its foreign policy and exacerbated the intraparty dynamics.¹⁵

Allegations, Internal Disputes, and Electoral Politics The turmoil within the party continued to intensify after it was alleged that Bhashani had received financial assistance from Ayub Khan during his presidential election campaign against Fatima Jinnah. Such allegations fueled antagonism among factions and calls for formal investigations in the party hierarchy.¹⁶

The problem ultimately led to the creation of "requisition's" group to hold formal party meetings to discuss Bhashani's political actions. Even though he was adamant about it, the controversy undermined their own unity within NAP. In 1965, his election as President was disputed, and he was elected to the presidency in 1965. In fact, the Basic Democracies electoral system was found to be in serious structural weaknesses in the presidential election. Opposition factions made numerous allegations of irregularities in the voting and administrative manipulation. In certain constituencies, the differences between expected and actual results of elections led to allegations of electoral engineering.¹⁷

In the tribal areas, the results were further complicated by the indirectness of the Basic Democracy system in which the local political agents were able to play an important role in screening the candidates. In the more peaceful urban areas like Mardan, Charsadda and Peshawar, the opposition had initially hoped for more than they got at the end.¹⁸ When unity within a party is lost.

Lack of party cohesion. The crisis was being aggravated within the party and senior figures such as Mahmud Ali Qasuri, Wali Khan and Arbab Sikandar Khan Khalil were directly reaching out to Bhashani for a solution. In the course of these talks, Bhashani is said to have admitted that he was engaged in politics with the government.¹⁹ Ultimately, because of the conflicting ideologies, organizational unity within the NAP proved impossible. Negotiations over leadership differences were unsuccessful and the party began to move closer to formal disintegration.²⁰

The War caused the further polarization of 1965. The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 further exacerbated ideological divisions within the NAP. The pro-China bloc was largely pro-war on the ground that Pakistan had its own interpretation of the war in the anti-imperialist perspective. The pro-Moscow side, on the other hand, denounced the war as a result of political adventurism, which disproportionately affected the workers. On the pro-China side, students' political organizations, peasant committees, and labor unions were strengthened, while there was a greater focus on student politics.²¹

¹⁵ Sherbaz Khan Mazari, *A Journey to Disillusionment* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 150.

¹⁶ Khalid B. Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), 236.

¹⁷ Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan*, 236.

¹⁸ Muhammad Kaswar Gardezi, *Hamari Tahreek: 1965–1968* (Lahore: Publicity Centre, National Awami Party Punjab and Bahawalpur, 1968), 70.

¹⁹ Ali, *Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power?* 143.

²⁰ C. R. Aslam, *Masala Kashmir: Jung aur Aman* (Resolution adopted at the General Body Meeting of the Punjab and Bahawalpur National Awami Party, Multan, September 26, 1965).

²¹ Badruddin Umar, *The Emergence of Bangladesh*, vol. 2 (Dhaka: Oxford University Press, 2004), 83.

On the other hand, critics of this movement maintained that it failed to live up to its ideological standards and that it showed strategic inconsistency because of its loyalty to Ayub Khan.²² This stance was also shared by the pro-Moscow faction led by Wali Khan, who were strongly anti-war and claimed that war was only a matter of peaceful conflict resolution, and also by regionalist leaders, who were concerned about the centralization of power under military rule.²³

6. Splits of NAP

The pro-Moscow group in East Pakistan had given Bhashani a notice to call a provincial council meeting for the same purpose. Ambiguity was observed in Bhashani's reply to the notice of requisition, as 133 councilors had signed it.²⁴ He did hold a special council meeting on 30th November at Rangpur but no individual notice was sent to the councilors and no agenda was set for the meeting. In such a situation the 'requisitions' demanded a special meeting of the council in Dhaka on December, 16-17. The organizers of the meetings were Dewan Mahbub Ali, Muzaffar Ahmad, Mohiy-ud-Din Ahmad and Habib-ur-Rahman. They pointed out four fundamental differences between the two factions (i) attitude towards the government, (ii) attitude towards a united opposition alliance, (iii) provincial autonomy and (iv) attitude towards the question of building a popular movement against the government. That the pro-Beijing group wanted alliance with the opposition parties, nor supported their resolution in favor of Six-Points of AL.²⁵

A formal split happened within East Pakistan NAP when a separate meeting of the council was held in Dhaka on 16-17 December 1967. One of the vice presidents of East Pakistan NAP, Dabir-ud-Din Ahmad presided over the first session. Meeting declared the council session of Rangpur illegal, unconstitutional and set aside its expulsion of leaders. The meeting was attended by Mahmud-ul-Haq Usmani and Ghulam Muhammad Leghari from West Pakistan. The council selected Muzaffar Ahmad as its president of the East Pakistan NAP. At that time there was an absence of any free elections and Altaf Hussain was elected general secretary of the party, and Habib-ur-Rahman and Abdul Halim as joint secretaries. Dewan Mahbub Ali, Atta-ur-Rahman and Qazi Muhammad Idris were elected vice presidents, Wahid Bux and Fazl-ur-Rahman were elected as treasurer and publicity secretary respectively.²⁶

The split was confined to East Pakistan and there was no formal arrangement on national level in this regard. Earlier the members of the working committee used to be nominated by the president which they considered concentration of power in one hand. In the meeting, it was suggested that the member of the working committee be elected by the council from now on. They blamed one reason for losing the show-down in the working committee meetings on the earlier procedure of nomination.²⁷

²² Leghari, "The Socialist Movement in Pakistan," 114.

²³ National Awami Party (Bhashani), "Resolution against U.S. Aggression in Vietnam and in Support of Freedom Fighters," July 19, 1966, circulated by Ghulam Muhammad Hashmi, Secretary, Publicity Section, National Awami Party, West Pakistan Office, Lahore; see also Shaukat Ali, *Vietnam*, Publication No. 18 (Lahore: National Awami Party Punjab, n.d.).

²⁴ *Pakistan Observer*, October 21, 1967.

²⁵ *Pakistan Observer*, October 23, 1967.

²⁶ *Pakistan Observer*, February 12, 1968.

²⁷ *Pakistan Observer*, February 10, 1968.

Maulana Bhashani was very angry on the establishment of a parallel NAP in East Pakistan. He stripped off Mahmud-ul-Haq-Usmani from primary membership and the post of general secretary. Instead, he authorized Muhammad Ishaq to act as the acting general secretary. It virtually paved the way for likely breakup of the party on national level. In March, 1968, the winds of disruption blew also to the West wing as the members of the party of Punjab and Bahawalpur chose the office bearers.

During the election process the party divided into two competing factions with the same divisions. One of them chose Muhammad Ishaq as the acting general secretary for president, while the other faction selected Sheikh Zahir-ud-Din Advocate. Since 1965, Punjab NAP was ripe in inner-party differences. The process was started as a result of personality clash among Muhammad Ishaq, Kaswar Gardezi, Mahmud Ali Qasuri and C. R. Aslam. In 1965, their differences started to emerge during the elections to the NAP chapter in Punjab and Bahawalpur. Consequently, two contending NAP factions were born out – the group of C. R. Aslam and the group of M. A. Qasuri.²⁸

Similarly, the Karachi chapter of the NAP was split as well. During the election Mahmud-ul-Haq Usmani got elected president and Azizullah got elected as general secretary. These elections were declared invalid by Afzal Bangash who acted as election commissioner for the election in Karachi branch of the party. Distraction news was also reported from Bannu where workers of the particular party protested against their district President Rahamzad Khan. A group of 33 NAP workers were then called to Peshawar for a possible patch up by Abdul Wali Khan and Arbab Sikandar Khan.²⁹

A virtual division was made into a national level meeting held at Peshawar on July 1, 1968. The meeting of the national council of the pro-Moscow NAP was attended by around 300 delegates of which 76 were from East Pakistan. The meeting was in many ways pivotal and historic. It was a declaration of the end of the relationship with Bhashani and his pro-Chinese elements. The meeting had injected NAP politics with a nationalistic flavor. It proved that the highest degree of solidarity is to be attained by granting the greatest possible accommodation to the federating elements. The workers were asked to raise slogans such as Bengali-Pashtun Bhai, Bhai (Bengali-Pashtun brother, brother); Punjabi-Sindhi Bhai, Bhai (Punjabi-Sindhi's brother, brother). In the beginning East Pakistani delegates had preferred M. H. Usmani for the party president. They aspired only for the slot of general secretaryship. However, the Punjab group was inclined to sponsor Mahmud Ali Qasuri which the East Pakistanis were not ready to accept.³⁰

Deliberations became prolonged and differences grew causing the delegates to fail to appoint office-bearers. An unusual event occurred when it was discovered that nearly all the members from West Pakistan (especially Punjab) voted for Qasuri as the president and all the members from East Pakistan cast their votes in favor of M. H. Usmani. In this debate G. B. Bizenjo suggested Abdul Wali Khan for the name of the East Pakistani as his political career was not a controversial one.³¹ The first session of the meeting was presided over by Muzaffar Ahmad at Royal Hotel Peshawar. Khan Abdul Wali Khan was unanimously elected as president of the party.³²

²⁸ Iqbal Leghari, 'The Socialist Movement in Pakistan', p. 122.

²⁹ *Pakistan Times*, Rawalpindi, March 3, 1968.

³⁰ *Pakistan Observer*, July 5, 1968.

³¹ Abdullah Malik, *Dastan-i-Khanwada Mian Mahmud Ali Qasuri*, p. 388.

³² Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, *In Search of Solutions*, p. 129. Also see *Pakistan Times*, July 2, 1968.

In a rare display of political wisdom the East Pakistani delegates, seeing that Usmani was not going to become the president, relinquished their own demand so that Usmani was to be elected the general secretary. It was in this gathering that the NAP pro-Moscow spelled out its program and pinpointed its differences with the other group. It was at this meeting that it decided to become a separate party and changed its name to Pakistan National Awami Party. The office bearers and members of the central working committee were elected unanimously, following the leaders. i. Khan Abdul Wali Khan President ii. Dabir-ud-Din Ahmad Vice President iii. Amir Hussain Shah Vice President iv. Mahmud-ul-Haq Usmani General Secretary v. Dewan Mahbub Ali Joint Secretary vi. Mr. Ajmal Khattak Joint Secretary vii. Mohiy-ud-Din Treasurer A new twenty-member National working committee was established,³³ the NWFP and Baluchistan NAP joined the party en bloc.

Abdul Wali Khan in his very first speech of the party, thanked the party delegates for their trust in him as at that time he was not a primary member of the party. He mentioned the political situation and on the request of the delegate of East Pakistan he gave permission to the provincial presidents to put out names for the working committee. He also spoke about the tribal areas and the issue of the anomaly regarding their political status. He insisted on extending the political arena to these places, and gave full opportunity for opposition political canvassing.³⁴

NAP (Wali) had defeated the rural and semi feudal masses in the urban centers, such as Peshawar, Mardan, Cassada and Nowshera. Certain writers believe that Abdul Ghaffar Khan was the right man and his lieutenants to help lead the NAP. But at that time, he was not active in the politics of the country. Most of the time he was in Afghanistan, or in prison. For many political commentators, his political thoughts were considered as the ideology of the NAP (Wali). He made Abdul Wali Khan his political successor. He established pockets of party workers in the southern parts of NWFP. The workers of the party in Punjab were largely from urban areas of Lahore, Faisalabad and Bahawalpur. Following the inaugural speech of Wali Khan, a large number of political workers along with all the participants of the meeting, who numbered around ten thousand, started to advance on the streets of Peshawar, and began to chant slogan of unity and solidarity. The procession reached to Chowk Yadgar where it was changed into a full-fledge political rally of the NAP. There were approximately half a million workers in attendance who listened attentively to their leaders' speech. Initially the two groups were known as pro-Beijing and pro-Moscow groups but later on it apparently came down to NAP (Bhashani) and NAP (Wali).³⁵

The NAP (Wali) explained that there are several reasons for the division which can be summarized as follows: NAP had been conscious of the fact that the government of the country was an autocratic one of big bourgeoisie and landlords and in the interest of the people this government should be replaced by a democratic one. There was a party faction, however, which had suddenly found itself with an

³³ The twenty-member national working committee was formed during the meeting. These members included Muzaffar Ahmad, Pir Habib-ur-Rahman, Moni Krishna Sen, Hatim Ali Khan, Syed Altaf Hussain, Ahmad-ul-Kabir, Mrs Salina Bano, Abd-ud-Razzaq, Aziz-ul-Haq, Maulana Ahmad-ur-Rahman Azmi, Amirzada Khan, Arbab Sikandar Khan, Mahmud Ali Qasuri, Shaikh Rafique Ahmad, Anwar Choudhury, Rauf Tahir, Saif Khalid, Abdul Majid Sindhi, Aizaz Nazir, and Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo. See Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, *In Search of Solution*, p.129.

³⁴ *Pakistan Observer*, July 5, 1968, also Khan Abdul Wali, *Bacha Khan aur Khudai Khidmatgar*, Vol. II, p. 433.

³⁵ Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, *In Search of Solution*, p. 130.

unusually anti-government stance towards the present government. imperialist and therefore, their opposition to it was qualified. ii. The NAP has a clear policy to establish a broad united front of all the democratic and opposition forces, based on the minimum political program, acceptable to all the parties concerned. But the leaders of the radical pro-Bhashani group had sabotaged the growth of the popular movement. iii. NAP had announced as its ultimate objective that it would strive for socialism in a democratic manner. Considering the unique socio-economic situation of the country, it was necessary to make such a transition from capitalism to socialism. But the militant group had lowered down the prestige of the party in the eyes of the public through deviation from the declared policy of the party. iv. As a result a large section of the party in both the wings of the country had firmly stood their ground against this group and its flawed policies and tried to uphold the accepted program of the party. Towards the end, they established their own parallel organization which they named the National Awami Party. v. The worst impact of the split was on the most liberal wing of the Democratic left.³⁶

7. Leadership and Provincial Politics

The Leadership panaches of the two groups deviated meaningfully. Bhashani's leadership was attractive and ideologically determined, emphasizing participation and mass plea. The party worked done discrete nets, collation ideological potentials and placement over authorized party structures.³⁷ While, Wali Khan, in difference, tinted administrative punishment, coalition-building, and political negotiations. The party supported prearranged party constructions and fascinated on combination stimulus within usual political administrations. These unpredictable leadership methods overstated rebel harmony, electoral attainment, and ongoing political motivation.³⁸

NAP Bhashani's electoral effect was imperfect owed to its indispensable stance and pressure on mass activities external from official parliamentary structures. Despite general provision between peasants and laborers in East Pakistan, the party challenged state conquest, custodies, and limitations on political activity.³⁹ Yet, Bhashani's participation expressively formed the critique on peasant rights, land reforms, and anti-imperialism.

At the same time, NAP–Wali achieved better success in the parliamentary system. In the 1970 general elections, the party achieved well in the North-West Frontier Province, gaining legislative seats and manipulating provincial governance.⁴⁰ Wali Khan's strategic attention on coalitions permitted the party to contribute in policy-making, particularly concerning provincial autonomy and managerial reforms. These attainments established the effectiveness of practical political appointment for leftist parties in Pakistan's federal context.

Both groups confronted antagonism from the state, although differently. Bhashani's fundamental involvement asked shortest conquest, counting police action, detention of activists, and confines on public meetings. Wali Khan's parliamentary method, though less argumentative, confronted political

³⁶ Resolutions passed at the Pakistan National Awami Party council meeting held on June 30 and July 1, 1968 Peshawar

³⁷ S. Akbar Zaidi, *Military, State, and Society in Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012), 203–209

³⁸ C. Christine Fair, *Political Dynamics of Pakistan's Left Movements* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008), 56–61

³⁹ Akbar S. Hussain, *East Pakistan and the Leftist Struggle: 1947–1971* (Dhaka: University Press, 1990), 174–79.

⁴⁰ Abdul Wali Khan, *Politics of Autonomy: NAP–Wali in the NWFP* (Peshawar: Frontier Publications, 1985), 33–39.

relegation and administrative challenges.⁴¹ The split and succeeding state suppression debilitated the general inspiration of the left in Pakistan, causative to the failure of prearranged socialist politics nationally.

Comparative Analysis of Key Differences between NAP (B) and NAP (W)

Aspect	NAP–Bhashani	NAP–Wali
Ideology	Radical socialism, anti-imperialism	Democratic socialism, provincial autonomy
Strategy	Mass mobilization, strikes, rallies	Parliamentary engagement, coalitions
Leadership	Charismatic, ideologically-driven	Pragmatic, institution-focused
Electoral Performance	Limited	Stronger in NWFP
Geographic Focus	East Pakistan	NWFP & provincial regions
State Response	Repression, arrest	Political marginalization

8. Conclusion

In 1957, the National Awami Party (NAP) had been formed as a secular, leftist and regional political party and Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani was one of its leading members. But by the 1920s the party had a split in its ranks, with ideological and strategic differences. In 1967, the difference in the political stance of Bhashani and Khan Abdul Wali Khan and Muzaffar Ahmed became more visible.

The differences involved were over China and the Soviet Union, regional autonomy, nationalism, political change, and more. By 1967-1968, due to the conflict inside the organization two factions emerged, popularly known as NAP-Bhashani and NAP-Wali. In the general elections of the 1970's, NAP-Wali actively campaigned in West Pakistan and did a lot better in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP); on the contrary, NAP-Bhashani mostly boycotted the elections in East Pakistan.

The political crisis of 1971 and formation of Bangladesh further changed the political stances of the two factions. Bhashani's political work started to be linked to the politics of independent Bangladesh and NAP-Wali's continued political work in Pakistan gained momentum in parliamentary and provincial politics. In 1972-73, Bhashani remained committed to the cause of peasants, workers, and other underprivileged communities and NAP-Wali was actively involved in NWFP provincial politics. As the decade of the 1970s progressed, political tensions grew in Pakistan especially between the NAP-Wali leadership and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's government.

In 1975, the federal government outlawed NAP and imprisoned a number of its leaders, thereby undermining the organized opposition from the left. Martial law, political repression, and ideological polarization of left and progressive political movements further undermined these movements following the military coup of General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977. The influence of the NAP tradition slowly waned from

⁴¹ Ayesha Jalal, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in Pakistan: State Responses to Political Opposition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 142–48.

1977 due to the repression of the state, internal divisions within the NAP, ideological fragmentation, and the coming of new political parties. However, Bhashani and Wali Khan's political legacies remained to shape progressive, nationalist and leftist politics in both Pakistan and Bangladesh.

NAP–Bhashani and NAP–Wali signifies two separate methods in Pakistan's leftist political custom. They both sought a social justice, a regional autonomy, and socialist enhancements, but their respective plans, leadership, and relationship with state defined different political pathways. The lessons these groups learned in the past provide useful insights into issues of factionalism, leadership, strategy, and the viability of leftist work in a stimulating political climate. Sympathetic these subtleties are crucial for scholars, politicians, and campaigners' perusal liberal politics in South Asia. The political struggle had put the National Awami Party (NAP) further into the political wilderness. However, the Military coups in 1958, 1969 and 1977 in Pakistan ensured the party remained in the hands of checked, assertive leaders, who would need to agree to be in authority or operate in clandestine ways. But each time the party was crumpled, its communication of standup for alteration and improvement grew sturdier, creation it a permanent sign of protest. Although NAP never had a lead party, it planted ideas which influenced the future of the politics of Pakistan. For example, the 1970 Constitution was intended with a reasonable distribution of control in mind—an idea. NAP had been aggressive for numerous years. Also, the party's emphasis on equality and impartiality still stimulates today's activities that fight against unfairness and call for more say for provinces. To conclude, NAP was not merely a political organization; it was a singing that challenged the staunch control of the federal authorities, bolstered the numerous dissimilar factions within Pakistan and illustrated how socialist and anti-imperialist thinking can shape national conversations even during the most challenging periods.

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