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Comparative Analysis of 1965 and Indo-Pak 2025 Conflict

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ABSTRACT

The main focus of this research paper is to comparatively analyze the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 and 2025. Both the nations fought different wars on the Kashmir issue. 1965 war saw a significant tank battles between India and Pakistan. Similarly, 2025 war involved multi domain warfare including airstrikes, drone warfare, information and cyber operations. Similarly, conflict saw significant international diplomatic efforts. The main focus of this research is to analyze the warfare with both sides. Similarly, Pakistan economics situation during the conflicts of 1965 and 2025 also highlighted in this paper.

Keywords: Operations, Economy, Military, Navy, Air Force, Diplomacy, Pakistan, India.

INTRODUCTION.

Relations between India and Pakistan not very cordial in South Asian region since independence. One of the main factor behind deterioration was Kashmir issue and different wars have been fought between two states. Unfortunately, both the nations did not remain successful to solve out the Kashmir issue. Similarly, the problems remain continue between two nations still and recently attack initiated by India against Pakistan became a new problem for both nuclear

state. The whole scenario shows the hostility of Indian government towards Pakistan. (Manurung Hendra)

Relations between India and Pakistan remain tense. Historically, wars have been fought between two states included 1948, 1965 as well as 1971 and Kargil war of 1999. Recently, over Pahalgam issue, escalation between India and Pakistan and military action taken by both states spoil the diplomatic relations between the governments. (India and Pakistan Conflict)

On 22 April 2025, Pahalgam attack resulting deaths of large number of peoples and Indian government put blame on Pakistan for this attack but government of India remain fail to get proofs of this attack against Pakistan and thus started Operation Sindoor which hits different sites in Pakistan. Apart from these, large number of civilians have been killed in Pakistan. This was also another time when integral sovereignty of Pakistan has been targeted by India like in 1965 and 1971 war. 1965 war has rooted in Kashmir dispute. India started full military operation against west Pakistan. Casualties occur on both sides. In response Pakistan initiated operation Gibraltar. (Pakistan India Tension)

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY.

The selected topic is important to know about the nature of war between India and Pakistan during 1965 and 2025. The study is important because it comparatively analyze the war between Pakistan and India when in 1965 both the countries had not a nuclear state but in modern days both nations are nuclear state. So, this study comparatively explores the nature of war during 1965 and 2025 in order to know the military operations, the war impact on economic life of Pakistan and also the diplomacy of both countries during 1965 and 2025. Apart from that, the study is important because it highlights the evolution of warfare in South Asia from 1965 to 2025 and impact of technology, cyber tools and also changing geopolitics of the region. This study is providing a source of information to policymakers and analysts on future conflict trends.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS.

1. How did Pakistan's evolving military doctrine shape its battlefield in 2025 compared to 1965?
2. How did Pakistan's handling of wartime economy in 2025 compared to 1965?

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES.

1. To examine Pakistan's military shift from 1965 to 2025 warfare.
2. To compare economic policies during the time of war in 1965 and 2025.

1. Discussion and key findings of Military, Diplomacy and Economic domains during 1965 and 2025.

➤ **Comparative Insight: The Air campaign of 1965 and 2025.**

The war of 1965 between India and Pakistan continued by seventeen days and came to an end by a ceasefire. (Pakistan Air Force-Comprehensive Story) While, 2025 conflict between India and Pakistan remained for four days. (Dawn)

In 1965's conflict there was a limited fighter-bomber formations and night intruder raids and 2025 envisions network-centric and multi domain operations. 1965 PAF relied on transonic

F-86 Sabres and B-57 bombers, while on the other hand 2025 PAF fields were supersonic, AESA-radar fighters JF-17BIII, and J-10C armed with beyond-visual missiles. (News Analysis)

Category	1965 War	2025 (Four Days War)
Psychological Operations (PSYOPS)	Rudimentary and one-way Used Radio Pakistan & clandestine stations No dedicated units	AI-driven psyops and deepfakes Targeted emotional manipulation Strategic use of viral misinformation
Propaganda & Media Narratives	Controlled by the state No independent reporting Patriotic songs and exaggerated claims	24/7 multimedia battle Deepfakes, video game clips shown as real Narratives used to provoke emotional responses
Cyber Warfare & Disinformation	Nonexistent cyber front Radio jamming was the max tech	Active cyber warzone Ransomware, DDoS, malware AI-assisted disinformation spreads chaos
Social media & Communication	One-way, analog flow via radio & newspapers No viral spread of rumors	Real-time digital war Fake videos & images go viral Everyone a broadcaster; echo chambers magnified
Foreign Media & Diplomacy	Messages spread via embassies and Cold War diplomacy Little foreign press impact	Global media monitors disinformation Platforms like X & Meta are involved Diplomats engage to counter-narratives
Civilian Panic & Morale	Minimal panic due to slow info flows Patriotic control via radio songs & celebrations	Deepfakes caused panic (e.g., fake stadium bombings) Civilian confusion and troop morale affected

Source: Historical details are drawn from Pakistani and neutral accounts of the 1965 air war. Projections about the 2025 conflict rely on Pakistani defense analyses and independent studies (e.g. *The News International* and Stimson Center) that model likely operations. 1965 saw PAF claim local superiority in dogfights (Alam's Sabres famously dominated some battles). (Air War Over Kashmir)

Whereas 2025 saw neither side fully dominate the skies Indian AD systems blunted Pakistani strikes. (The India-Pakistan Crisis of 2025)

1965 had negligible jamming whereas, in 2025 both sides employ extensive EW and cyber warfare (PAF's KORAL pods, GPS jamming, etc. (News Analysis)

1965 used gravity bombs and unguided rockets whereas, 2025 used precision missiles (e.g. Storm Shadow/SCALP cruise missiles by IAF. (News Analysis)

1965 saw little direct civilian targeting whereas, 2025 fears included panic from deepfakes and cyber outages. (Deep fakes and the changing face of war)

Both wars drew international concern, but in 1965 the USSR/US brokered peace. (Pakistan Air Force)

Whereas, in 2025 urgent US/UN diplomacy (and nuclear hedging) restrained escalation. (Pak-India crisis of 2025)

➤ **Comparative Analysis of Information Warfare: Indo-Pakistani Conflicts 1965 and 2025**

In 1965, formal PSYOPS were in their rudimentary stages. Governments used one-way broadcasts and ground agents to sway populations. Pakistan's military had no dedicated psychological warfare units it relied on outlets like *Radio Pakistan* and clandestine stations (e.g., "Sada-e-Kashmir") to shout rebels' feats and demonize India. (illusion of victory: In the eyes of the media)

Cyber warfare was essentially non-existent in 1965. Communications were analog (radio, wired telegraph, newspapers) and military networks were isolated. The concept of "hacking" was decades away. As a result, there were no computer-driven attacks or online disinformation per se. Pakistani and Indian forces engaged in electronic warfare only via radio jamming or radar evasion, with no parallel digital front. By 2025, cyberspace would be an active war zone. (The Guardian)

Social media was absent in 1965. Pakistanis received news via government radio (Radio Pakistan), early TV (state-run PTV, launched mid-1960s), and newspapers. There were no platforms for citizen-to-citizen broadcasting. Rumors spread by word of mouth or pamphlet, and information flowed slowly. Pakistan's messaging was essentially one-way: the military's ISPR provided official updates, and there was no viral grassroots counter in the public sphere. (Stimson Center)

By 2025, the information domain is everywhere. Platforms like X (Twitter), Facebook, WhatsApp, and others would instantly relay claims and counterclaims. Experts describe a "social media war" in which every user is a potential broadcaster. For example, Pakistani media briefly reopened Twitter (X) in May 2025, researchers found it immediately became a hotbed of misinformation. Across apps, "fake videos using artificial intelligence" and doctored images spread like wildfire. (Pakistan Air Force Comprehensive Story)

During the 1965 war, Pakistan's narrative to the world came through diplomatic channels and the print foreign press. The Cold War context meant superpowers swiftly brokered ceasefire talks (culminating in the Soviet- brokered Tashkent Agreement), but global publics saw only sanitized reports. Foreign news outlets largely repeated official statements, neither side's propaganda

easily penetrated distant audiences. Pakistan's international voice was filtered through its UN and embassy channels. (News Analysis)

Both state and non-state actors attempted to cyber-sabotage. Pakistani hackers (and allied actors) launch malware, DDoS, and ransomware against Indian infrastructure, and vice versa. RUSI analysts note that immediately after the May 2025 crisis began, India's cybersecurity teams warned of a spike in "ransomware, DDoS attacks, data breaches and malware" targeting critical institutions. Even if these cyber incursions did not turn the tide of battles, they signaled a full-spectrum war. Simultaneously, disinformation would blur reality. (Royal United Services Institute)

➤ **Comparative Insight: The Land Campaign of 1965 and 2025.**

➤ **Operation Gibraltar and Grand Slam.**

Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik has started to train six forces for Operation Gibraltar on June, 1, 1965. The forces were named after the Islamic commanders, Tariq, Qasim, Khalid, Salahuddin, Ghaznvi, Babar. The largest force was Salahuddin with six companies of total around 700 Jawans. The second largest force was Ghaznvi with five companies of total around 600 Jawans and the smallest force was Babar comprising only 34 Jawans. The task given to Salahuddin force was to control Srinagar and Barahmula on entering the Indian Held Kashmir. On the other hand, Ghaznvi target was Kashmir. (Mahmoud, Ahmed).

The rest four forces were tasked to target bridges, military based and public building all over Indian Held Kashmir. One SSG commando was also included in every force. Expecting SSG commandos and some officers of the Pak Army all forces in the operation were named by Azad force, Northern Scouts and volunteers were nominated. Every force was given seven days Ration, 200 bullets each for the rifles, 400 bullets each for the Sten-guns, 900 bullets each for the light machine guns and 30 rockets each for the rockets launchers. Beside these, eight hand grenades were given to every Jawan. Apart from six forces, another fourteen forces were also raised which were named Nusrat forces. These forces were titled in alphabetical order e.g, A,B,C etc. The Nusrat forces comprised 100 to 350 Jawans. These forces were to attack the Indian Army on the ceasefire line with the start of Operation Gibraltar. So that the Indian forces get engaged on the spot and do not act against the Gibraltar forces in Kashmir. 7th August, 1965 was the fixed D-day which means the launching day of the Operation Gibraltar. But at the end of the July the Gibraltar forces already had begun to enter the occupied Kashmir. On the ordered of the General Malik 12 division kept the Indian troops engaged by the continuous firing on the ceasefire line. (Mahmoud, Ahmed).

On the other hand, Gibraltar forces Jawan had enter Kashmir crossing over as high as 12000 ft. mountains. These forces were told about the help to them by certain people in the occupied Kashmir. As every force was also told names of the secret helpers. It was also considered that the people of Kashmir will help them against Kashmir. As the Jawan cross the ceasefire line but no one came forth to help Gibraltar force. (Mahmoud, Ahmed).

Beyond all these things one of the dangers that came out, Indian forces had learned about the Operation Gibraltar. On the other hand, villagers in the border areas had informed the police about the presence of highly alert, armed strangers around their localities. Salahuddin force

committed another mistake by bribing a shepherd to know from him about the route and this shepherd went to nearby police station and recounted what he had seen. (Singh, Harbaksh) The whole situation creates confusion, hence the first attack was done between 5 and 6 August on the Indian 4-kumoan Battalion. Several bullets went over the officer's mess. In response India also retaliate to Operation Gibraltar by sending troops and the police to Kashmir at a large. Salahuddin force also a blew out a supply depot while encircling Srinagar airport. Dozens of police men were also killed. Salahuddin forces and Indian troops openly fighting on the street of Srinagar. (Bajwa, Farooq).

Large number of Indian soldiers were killed as well as many arms depots destroyed in that fighting. Indian troops dug out trenches in Srinagar planes and the whole war machinery was put to use in the battle. The whole valley was controlled by the Indian Army. Meanwhile, Salahuddin force also continued its attack according to the plan. Indian troops set on fire 15 troops and large number of innocent people in have been targeted under these attacks. (Bajwa, Farooq)

Above all, the India had a strong supply line and also air force and artillery were fully helping the Indian troops. While on the other hand, Pakistani troops without air and the artillery went out to conquer the Srinagar due to which it became impossible for Pakistani troops to retain hold on the city for a longer time which resulted the whole forces had surrounded by the enemy in the Srinagar due to lack of supplies nor military help from any other source. All these forces return back to valley because of strong retaliation started by Indian Army. But one of them forces was stay there and that force was Ghaznvi, it had freed 500sq. miles area of Jammu and established its government there and also completely eliminated a battalion of the Indian army.

However, it was decided that all the forces came back and then by the end of August 1965, failure of the Operation Gibraltar had been sealed. Next to operation Grand Slam, this operation was launched on 1 September 1965. Operation Grand Slam was a major Pakistani military offensive during the Indo-Pak war 1965, aimed at the capturing the strategic town of Akhnoor in Indian-administrated Jammu and Kashmir. (Bajwa, Farooq)

This operation followed Operation Gibraltar. As the operation Gibraltar failed due to lack of local support and Indian military retaliation, Operation Grand Slam was launched as a conventional military response. Initially it was successful in breaking Indian defenses in the Chhamb sector. One of the turning point of this operation was the change of general Akhtar Malik with general Yahyaa Khan. The main objective of the operation was to capture the strategic town of Akhnoor and cut off Indian supply lines to Kashmir. Pakistan could not achieve its main objective. As India launched a counterattack across international border towards Lahore and Sialkot. (Khan, Asghar)

➤ **Operation Bunyan-ul-Marsoos vs Operation Sindoor.**

Tensions between India and Pakistan escalated after the April 22 attack in Pahalgam, Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJK), which killed 26 people. India blamed Pakistan-based elements for the assault but provided no evidence. Islamabad strongly denied the allegations. (Al Jazeera). Pakistan's military response on Thursday followed four days of consecutive Indian attacks inside its territory and came two weeks after a deadly assault on tourists in the scenic town of Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir on April 22. India initiated

strikes on May 7, targeting areas inside Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. It called its attacks Operation Sindoor. (International Institute of Strategic Studies)

On 24 April 2024, the National Security Committee has approved the Foreign Ministry's recommendations to give a strong and decisive response to India's diplomatic and water-related aggression. The committee also reviewed a strategy to effectively counter any form of Indian adventurism. On 29 April 2025, DGISPR said that seven days have been passed since pahalgam incident but so far there have been no evidence that has been provided to support baseless allegations being against Pakistan. Four Indian Air Force Rafale jets conducted a patrol over occupied Kashmir on the night of 29th and 30th April. Caught off guard and rattled, the Indian Rafales fled. "We are ready, don't put us to the test". Pakistan Army Has Shot down 78 Indian Drones. (Press Conference, 2025).

On 7 May, in a retaliatory strike, Pakistan destroyed five Indian fighter jets. On 8 May, debris have been collected from various location belongs to Harop and Heron drones. On 10th May at the time of Fajar, Pakistan Army had given strong to Indian Army by launching Operation Bunyanum Marsoos. Fatah-I/II missile firing by Pakistan Army from Punjab to Pathan kot. This was a very powerful response to enemy. During land operation, Indian post hit by Pakistan Army included "Green Plateau Post, Jungle-1 post, DANNA 1 post, PHUKLIAN MORCHA, URI SUPPLY DEPOT, DHARAMSHAL 1 POST, TABLEPOT POST, RABTANWALI POST, DANNA BKR, RING CONTOUR, On the other hand, JF-17 thunder also destroyed Indians S-400.

Pakistan's response was a textbook demonstration of integrated jointness enabled by real-time situational awareness, network-centric warfare capabilities and seamless multi-domain operations. This synergy across air, land, sea, and cyber domains allowed for precision engagements, overwhelming lethality and rapid tempo. All platforms operated in synergy, delivering coordinated effects at carefully selected decisive points using precision-guided long-range missiles F1 and F2 of Pakistan Army. (Press Conference,2025)

The targets included air force and aviation bases at Suratgarh, Sirsa, Bhuj, Naliya, Adampur, Bathinda, Barnala, Halwara, Awantipora, Srinagar, Jammu, Udhampur, Mamun, Ambala and Pathankot, which all sustained major damages. Brahmos storage facilities at Bas and Nagpur were also destroyed, which had fired missiles on Pakistan killing innocent civilians - our flower-like children, our ladies and our elderly. S-400 battery systems at Adampur and Bhuj were also attacked by our proud Pakistan Air Force. Operation Banyan al-Marsoos has been a great example of coming together of all elements of national power with overwhelming support of the Pakistani public to effectively counter the threat to our national sovereignty and integrity and the threat to our great motherland. No one should have any doubt that whenever our sovereignty would be threatened and territorial integrity violated, the response would be comprehensive, retributive and decisive. (Press Conference,2025)

Aspect	1965 War	2025 War
Duration	17 days	4 days
Main Ops	Gibraltar, Grand Slam	Bunyan ul Marsoos, Sindoor
Pak Goal	Kashmir revolt, captured Akhnoor	Respond to aggression, hit strategic targets
India Goal	Defend territory, retaliate conventionally	Neutralize threats, maintain dominance
Tactics	Guerilla, conventional	Drones, missiles
Pak Gains	Temporary territorial Control	Damage Indian radars, bases
Pak losses	No local support, failed offensives	Drone losses, limited long term effect
India Gains	Repelled infiltrators, secured Kashmir	Effective strikes, defended key sites
India Losses	Caught off guard initially	Lost drones/jets, couldn't stop retaliation
Ceasefire	USSR-brokered (Tashkent), no clear winner	US/ Russia mediated, both sides claimed victory

Source: *Ibid*➤ **Comparative Analysis of Economic Structure: 1965 vs. 2025**

Indicator	1964–65 (Pre-War Period)	1965–66 (War Period)	2023–24 (Pre-War Period)	2024–25 (War Period)
Real GDP Growth (%)	4.8%	~4.8%	2.5%	2.7%
Agriculture Growth (%)	3.5%	1.6%	6.3%	0.9%
Industry Growth (%)	2.3%	6.2%	2.48%	4.77%
Fiscal Deficit (% GDP)	≈ 2.0%	~5.0%	6.8%	6.8%
Inflation (year-end, %)	5.8%	~10.0%	29.2%	4.61%
Current Account (% GDP)	−0.5%	−0.6%	−0.5%	+0.2%

Indicator	1964–65 (Pre-War Period)	1965–66 (War Period)	2023–24 (Pre-War Period)	2024–25 (War Period)
Reserve (months import)	1.2 months	n.a.	2.1 months	2.5 months
Per-Capita Income	Rs 372	Rs 381	USD 1,680	USD 1,824

Source: *Economic Surveys of Pakistan 1964-1967 & 2023-2025*

➤ **Brief Overview of Economy before the Conflicts: 1965 and 2025**

In the mid-1960s, Pakistan was experiencing a period of significant economic growth, largely due to the development policies implemented by Ayub Khan. During the fiscal year 1964-65, the country's real GDP grew by about 4.8%, driven by a government-led push for industrialization and a flourishing agricultural sector (Hamid et al, 1990). At that time, inflation was relatively moderate, hovering around 5-6%, the government was operating with a small budget deficit of about 2% of GDP, and industrial growth struggled on 2.3% compared to early 1960s due to US aid cuts since Sino-Indian conflict, as Pakistan signaled support toward the Chinese.

Fast forward to the fiscal year 2023-24, and the picture looks quite different. Pakistan's economy was struggling, with growth rates barely reaching 2.5%. Inflation had surged to alarming levels, around 23-29.2%, industrial growth had crippled, and the fiscal deficit had ballooned to 6.8% of GDP (Economic Survey of Pakistan, 2023-2024). Several structural issues were contributing to this decline, including persistent energy shortages, a heavy debt burden, and the impact of global events like the COVID-19 pandemic, natural disasters, and disruptions in supply chains.

In the domain of agriculture, the situation had flipped compared to the past. Back In 1964-65, growth was a modest 3.5%, but in the fiscal year 2023-24, it had surged to an impressive 6.3%, due to record crop harvests following favorable rainfall. The availability of ample water and fertilizer had led to significant increases in key crops: wheat production rose by 11.6%, cotton skyrocketed by 108%, and rice increased by 34.8% (Economic Survey of Pakistan, 2023-2024). However, this agricultural boom hid underlying vulnerabilities.

The currency and trade landscape also showed a stark contrast. In the 1960s, Pakistan had a very small current-account deficit of about -0.5% of GDP and low reserves, covering only around 1.2 months of imports. In 2023-2024, due to substantial remittances and reforms supported by the IMF, reserves had improved to cover approximately 2 to 2.5 months of imports (World Bank, 2024).

➤ **Economic Structure during conflict periods:1965–66 vs. 2024–25**

When looking at GDP and industry, the situation during the 1965 war offers an interesting contrast to what happened during 2025 conflict period. During the 1965 war, Pakistan's economy did not take a nosedive; instead, it maintained a growth rate of about 4.8% that year. This

resilience was largely due to the fact that increased defense spending actually stimulated industrial output. In fact, manufacturing and construction saw a notable surge of around 6.2% in 1965-66 (Hamid et al., 1990). Wartime mobilization efforts, particularly in steel and armaments, along with government contracts, kept factories busy. Pakistan also redirected a significant portion of rural resources, about 15% of agricultural value-added, toward industry to support industrialization.

In stark contrast, the fiscal year 2024-2025 (conflict period) saw a relatively less industrial growth compared to 1965 war context, but performed significantly better as compared to the fiscal year 2023-2024. However, due the volatile security circumstances the investments could dry up, leading to shutting down of factories, as Pakistan agricultural output in 2025 is not as consistent as it was in 1960s that could be invested in factories, so the foreign companies would likely pull out due to the sense of uncertainty.

In 1965, the conflict, combined with a severe drought, had a devastating impact on food production in Pakistan. Agricultural growth plummeted to just 1.6% during the fiscal year 1965-66, as military mobilization and water shortages made it extremely challenging to maintain a steady supply of food grains. In the aftermath of the war, the government responded by raising wheat prices and adopting high-yield seeds as part of the Green Revolution, which helped boost agricultural output by the following year (Hamid et al., 1990).

Fast forward to the twenty first century, and agriculture has emerged as a bright spot in the economy, with growth reaching an impressive 6.3% in the period 2023-2024. However, the year of the conflict (FY 2025) saw a severe damage to the agricultural growth, taking it to the lowest in 9 years, to about 0.9%. (Economic Survey of Pakistan, 2024-2025). This decline stems from a mix of challenges, including rising production costs, falling commodity prices, a weak marketing system, and low crop yields, all made worse by climate change. Additionally, poor governance and ineffective policies play a role in this crisis.

The Pakistan Agricultural Research Council (PARC) had reported alarming yield losses across key crops, especially cotton and maize, due to fertilizer shortages during crucial sowing periods. These issues have threatened the food security for millions (Economic Survey of Pakistan, 2024-25).

The 2024-25 season faced severe climate fluctuations, with significant rainfall deficits and unpredictable monsoons leading to production declines in wheat and rice. Average temperatures in agricultural areas have increased, adding more stress to crops like sugarcane (Economic Survey of Pakistan, 2024-25). Pakistan's vulnerability to climate change is clear as it ranks as the 8th most climate-vulnerable nation. Ongoing water shortages due to seepage and evaporation, largely due to inefficiencies in the Indus Basin Irrigation System, exacerbate the crisis.

High production costs and low crop yields worsen due to insufficient investment in agricultural research and limited access to modern farming methods. The marketing system is also failing farmers. Many depend on middlemen who take a large share of their profits. This exploitation, along with the difficulties of reaching formal markets, has led many farmers into deep debt. In

case India were to further suspend the Indus Waters Treaty in 2025, Pakistan could face severe irrigation shortages.

When it comes to fiscal matters and inflation, war has historically led to a significant increase in government spending in Pakistan. During the fiscal year 1965-66, defense expenditures doubled, resulting in the country's first-ever budget deficit, which reached about 5% of GDP that year (Pakistan Economic Survey, 1972-73). However, after the war, a combination of increased taxation and economic growth allowed Pakistan to quickly return to a budget surplus. In contrast, as we look ahead to 2024-25, Pakistan is already facing a substantial deficit of around 6.8% of GDP. This means that any additional war spending would put even more pressure on the budget. Regarding inflation, the 1960s saw relatively stable prices, with inflation hovering around 5-10%. Wartime pressures only nudged inflation up to about 10%. However, the situation was much direr, with consumer prices skyrocketing in the period 2023-2024, which was around 29.2% (Economic Survey of Pakistan, 2023-2024). This increase in prices are due to floods disrupting supply chains, energy prices rise (mainly due to Russo-Ukraine War), and the value of the currency dropped against other global currencies, which made imported goods and services more expensive.

However, the global energy crisis alleviated to a great extent, and the new tax reforms implemented in the period 2024-25 have brought the inflation down to an average of 4.61% (Economic Survey of Pakistan, 2024-2025). One thing the government should not overlook is that the agriculture, which is the backbone of the major industries in Pakistan, is crumbling, and the severe taxation is straining the salaried class the most. This fall in inflation will be unsustainable in the long run if the agriculture is not restored and the strain on the population due to increased taxes is not alleviated, as it can push people into poverty and food crisis regardless of the lesser inflation rates.

When it comes to trade and reserves in the 1965 conflict, the war effectively froze trade with India and led to increased import bills, particularly for military purchases, which worsened the current account. However, the deficits remained relatively small, around -0.6% of GDP (Pakistan Economic Survey 1965-66). Notably, Pakistan did receive some foreign aid after the war, which helped stabilize the situation.

By the end of 2024-25, a modest current-account surplus of about +0.2% of GDP occurred. This happened because wartime controls likely lead to a sharp decline in imports, while remittances increased. However, the real concern for Pakistan is its limited reserves which can only cover about 2.5 months of imports (World Bank, 2025). However, reserves might stay around 2.5 months of import coverage as IMF structural adjustment programs and reforms are taking effect, which would help to absorb the war shocks, but not as effectively as Pakistan did during 1965 due increased industrial output, strong agriculture and foreign aid, which is not the case in 2025. In terms of socioeconomic impact, the situation in 1965 was quite different. The per-capita income at that time was roughly Rs 372, which barely changed during the war, rising to about Rs 381 by 1966-67 (Pakistan Economic Survey, 1966-67). 1 USD was constantly equivalent to 4.67 PKR from 1956 to 1971, which indicates that even slight increase in per-capita income was

considerable, especially in the times of turmoil during the war. In contrast, today's per-capita GDP is around \$1,824, with projections suggesting it could rise to about \$1,850 by FY2026 (Economic Survey of Pakistan, 2024-2025). These gains are impressive but unsustainable due to various factors such as declining agriculture and slow industrial growth that would erode real incomes.

➤ **Diplomacy in India-Pakistan Conflicts**

In this portion, we will look into the diplomatic environment and conduct of India and Pakistan during the 1965 and 2025 war and how diplomacy has evolved. While the simmering issues like the Kashmir dispute, cross-border terrorism, and water rights remained unresolved, the diplomatic conduct of both states and the responses of major international powers have undergone significant evolution, fundamentally shaped by shifts in global order, the nuclear revolution in South Asia and the diversification of Pakistan's strategic partnerships.

Diplomacy is not just formal negotiations but also reaching out to other forms such as strategic communication and narrative control as in the case of India-Pakistan conflicts. The 2025 conflict, following a four-day standoff involving missile and drone attacks, saw diplomacy become a "new battlefield" (Malik, 2025). This brings out the role that diplomacy plays in contemporary warfare; it is not a passive practice that is necessary to stop war battles, but a performative and ideological machinery (Maryam et al. 2025, 3433).

An example is militarized discourse, a strategic application of language to render normal, heroic, and justified military aggression as something desirable to defend and preserve the nation. What it implies is that formal messages communicate more than the description of the military engagement; they moralize the state of affairs, they justify it, and they place it into the discursive context of national defense (Maryam et al. 2025, 3433)

➤ **Diplomatic Environment of 1965 and 2025**

The Indo-Pakistan War that happened in 1965 was closely linked to the Cold War situation. The United States, frustrated by both India and Pakistan using US-supplied arms against each other, adopted a "neutral, hands-off stance," imposing a total embargo on military aid to both nations (Bajwa 1965, 19, 234; Sattar 2019, 86). This "plague on both your houses" policy was perceived by Pakistan as a "fatal blow" and a "stab in the back," leading to a profound sense of betrayal (Bajwa 1965, 237). This intervention of the US set an example of non-intervention in conflicts between India and Pakistan in the future.

The United Kingdom initially criticized India for escalating the war and requested assurances on British weapons use, causing "huge resentment in India". China is the only other significant power which Pakistan thought would support it, and it did so with words but was strategically cautious enough such that direct military action was not taken since that would have implicated the US and USSR in the war (Bajwa 1965, 239). The Soviet Union had no commitment initially but moved to a more practical posture of mediation, which led to the Tashkent Declaration, to curb Chinese influence (Bajwa 1965, 88, 224, 371; NDU Military History Pub n.d., 23; Sattar 2019, 88-89). Pakistan's heavy reliance on formal alliances like CENTO and SEATO proved a miscalculation,

as these were explicitly stated by the US and UK as not applying to the conflict (Bajwa 1965, 236; Sattar 2019, 86).

Meanwhile, The 2025 conflict occurred in a fundamentally altered environment, primarily defined by the nuclearization of the subcontinent. The presence of nuclear weapons acts as a powerful restraint on conventional escalation, pushing conflicts towards "war by other means". Pakistan explicitly leveraged this nuclear dimension in its diplomacy, raising concerns over India's dual-use capability of missiles like the Brahmos, aiming to attain international concern regarding India's recklessness (Das 2025, 28).

New strategic alignments are evident, with Türkiye identified as a "key defense partner" for Pakistan, whose drones were used in the conflict (Das 2025, 26). This signifies a diversification of Pakistan's strategic partnerships beyond traditional Western allies, reducing susceptibility to aid conditionality and allowing for a more independent foreign policy. Diplomacy itself became a "new battlefield" (Das 2025, 25), characterized by aggressive narrative warfare and information campaigns. Although the Kashmir issue has always been a simmering point, novel lines of action such as cross-border terrorism and Indus Waters Treaty are now outrightly presented as possible flash points that may touch off war and have complicated the diplomatic scene (Das 2025, 27-28).

➤ **Diplomatic Conduct of 1965 and 2025**

In 1965, Pakistan's diplomatic conduct was driven by a desire to leverage the conflict for a Kashmir resolution. President Ayub Khan publicly declared Pakistan "at war with India," framing India as the aggressor (Bajwa 1965, 221). Pakistan requested the US to act "immediately under 1959 Agreement to suppress and vacate Indian aggression," depicting its reliance on the western allies (Bajwa 1965, 224). Pakistan's ceasefire conditions were explicitly linked to Kashmir, demanding withdrawal of forces, UN deployment, and a plebiscite. Foreign Minister Bhutto emphasized Kashmir's solution was "more important than the issue of US arms" (Bajwa 1965, 225). When the US imposed an aid embargo, Bhutto publicly questioned why allies weren't assisting Pakistan, now "cornered and deserted". This prompted Ayub to rely on Chinese support which was to be given on the condition of not yielding to US, Soviet or UN external pressure on the Kashmir issue (Bajwa 1965, 240).

Great powers reacted in different ways through their involvement. The US followed what can be termed as a plague on both your houses policy, which resulted in an embargo of military aids (Bajwa 1965, 369). The British were critical of India going big and offered a four-phase solution to the problem but made it clear that alliances were not part of it. China has provided rhetoric support to Pakistan but did not intervene directly by using the military (Bajwa 1965, 239). It was the mediatory action of the Soviet Union, which finally led to the Tashkent Declaration.

While in 2025, India launched a proactive and extensive "global diplomatic campaign," sending delegations to more than 30 countries (Das 2025, 25). India's primary accusation was that Pakistan supported "terrorist groups," with spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal stating the goal was to "exhort the world to hold those responsible for cross-border terrorism accountable" (Das 2025, 25). Modi's remarks, reflecting "ultra-nationalism," were "targeted at a domestic audience" (Das

2025, 27), and his post-crisis comments indicated a new policy of direct retaliation for any attack on Indian soil (Das 2025, 29). India's Ministry of Defense used a discourse of "technocratic legalism" and "calibrated restraint," employing terms like "precision engagement" and "strategic neutrality" to position its actions within international norms (Maryam et al. 2025, 3433).

Pakistan's diplomatic response was defensive yet assertive. It denied India's allegations and called for a "transparent, credible, independent" investigation (Das 2025, 25). Prime Minister Sharif expressed willingness to engage in dialogue on "all matters" if India reciprocated "in all sincerity" (Das 2025, 25). A Pakistani delegation was to visit the US, UK, and EU headquarters (Das 2025, 26) with Sharif, Munir, and Dar being among the delegates. This trip aimed to highlight Pakistan's "capacity to wage a modern war against a larger adversary," noting "immense interest in how Pakistan fought the recent war" (Hussain, 2025).

Khurram Dastgir Khan outlined Pakistan's "three major hurdles" to lasting peace: "Indian-sponsored terrorism," India's "utterly irresponsible suspension of the IWT," and concern over India's "status as a responsible nuclear power" (Hussain, 2025). Khan warned that any Indian step to stop Pakistan's water would be treated as an "act of war" (Hussain, 2025). ISPR drew on "religious symbolism, emotional affect, and humanitarian appeals," using phrases like "cowardly attack," "martyrs," and "befitting reply" to sacralize its military response (Maryam et al. 2025, 3433). Pakistan also explicitly raised concerns over India's use of the BrahMos missile, injecting the risk of nuclear escalation into the diplomatic discourse (Haroony, 2025)

➤ **Comparative Analysis: Evolution of War Diplomacy and Key Features**

The 1965 and 2025 wars comparisons indicate that the world has changed a lot in terms of interactions and international environment.

➤ **Alliance Dynamics and Strategic Autonomy:**

By far the most dramatic evolution can be seen in the alliance dynamics. In 1965, Pakistan's heavy reliance on the US proved a critical vulnerability, leading to a sense of betrayal when aid was cut off (Bajwa 1965, 237-238; Sattar 2019, 86-87). In 2025, Pakistan diversifies its strategic relationships, including those with such countries as Türkiye, thus losing reliance on any global power (Das 2025, 26). This change indicates increased strategic independence of India as well as Pakistan who are not just mere pawns in a bigger chess game governed by the global powers but operating as actors and they can carve new alliances.

By 2025, Pakistan had smartly diversified its relationship, and it had strong relations with China, Kazakhstan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Such strategy enabled Pakistan to receive critical support of both Russia and United States in regard to neutral investigation and ceasefire, proving that it can act independently of the so-called pivot state model, and can effectively interact with a broader range of international players. It can also be seen in context of "dependence-Independence paradox" (Lavoy, 2009) which states that Nuclearization made India and Pakistan independent of the aid or help from the foreign powers but ultimately the threat of proliferation and nuclear escalation made them more dependent on the international community for mediation (Lavoy, 2009). So, they are independent actors but their nuclearization and enduring rivalry made them dependent on the international community's engagement.

➤ **Nuclearization and its effect:**

The most critical gap is the nuclear factor. The 1965 war took place in an environment that was pre-nuclear, thus diplomatic sanctioning meant use of conventional aid and UN support (Das 2025, 29). This also changes the international gaze away from assistance to strategic stability and non-proliferation. The threat of nuclear escalation is something Pakistan portends as it bothers international actors in its negotiations in an attempt to mediate. This demonstrates the "stability-instability paradox," where nuclear deterrence raises the stakes of limited conflicts, compelling faster diplomatic responses.

➤ **Narrative Control and Framing:**

Narrative control has become very polished. In 1965, narratives were simpler: India's self-defense versus Pakistan's Kashmir-centric demands. By 2025, both nations employ highly refined framing strategies. India uses "technocratic legalism" and "calibrated restraint" (Maryam et al. 2025, 3433), while Pakistan employs "religious symbolism" and "sacred retribution" (Maryam et al. 2025, 3433). Despite these divergent rhetorical registers, both discourses exhibit "structural symmetry in their use of positive self-representation and negative Othering" (Maryam et al. 2025, 3433).

Diplomacy has become a "performative and ideological apparatus" (Maryam et al. 2025, 3433), where language actively constructs strategic realities. Even though the use of propaganda played a role in 1965, the conflict in 2025 led to the emergence of new media management and control of information as a decisive diplomatic factor.

The successful diplomatic approach in Pakistan was credited to the right media strategy. This was in combination with the strategic control of information to detract key aspects of operational losses and towards emphasizing narratives that focused on resilience and strength to reverse the spotlight on the setback of military failure to diplomatic defiance (modern diplomacy. eu, 2025). Nevertheless, Pakistan's response was described as "calm but robust," demonstrating its dedication to regional stability and national defense (Malik, 2025).

➤ **The New Diplomatic Flash points:**

As much as Kashmir continues to be a lingering issue, other newer diplomatic flash points coming up are equally volatile and prone to give way in the year 2025. Threats of cross-border terrorism and Indus Water treaty now overtly lamented as possible war-waging actions and the nuclear security fears (Das 2025, 27-28). This expands the diplomatic agenda and makes solving much more difficult.

➤ **Comparative Insight Role of Naval War in 1965 and 2025**

Generally speaking, both Pakistan and India navies did not play any significant role during the 1965 war, but it had a sustained effect on the regional security process. India wanted to limit war to only ground and air combat, but the maneuvers of Pakistan pointed out that India was not the only presence in the region, which is why sea war was a big factor. Pakistan Navy was on alert since March 1965 at the time of the conduct of the Ran of Kutch Operation. Training persisted even during the monsoons, and in August, all leave was cancelled in the fleet, and readiness was made in case of hostilities (Khan & Abbasi, 2012).

➤ **Naval Strength Comparison**

Platform	Pakistan Navy	Indian Navy
Cruisers	1	3
Destroyers/Frigates	7	19
Submarines	1	0
Naval Air Arm	None	Available

There is no doubt that India was numerically superior in all except one category when it came to naval strength in September 1965. However, what cemented Pakistan's advantage in the underwater field was the PNS Ghazi, the only submarine it had at that time. This submarine difference is what made the last influence. (Khan & Abbasi, 2012).

On September 7, the Pakistan Navy (PN) initiated Operation Dwarka, a daring raid on the Indian port city. The operation involved several ships: Babur, Khaibar, Badr, Jahangir, Alamgir, Shahjahan, and Tippu Sultan. Each ship fired 50 rounds during the operation, which lasted only four minutes. After completing their mission, the ships returned safely and continued to patrol a 100-mile area off the coast of Karachi. The task group, consisting of Babur, Khaibar, Badr, Jahangir, Alamgir, Shahjahan, and Tippu Sultan, was positioned 120 miles from the Dwarka Lighthouse at a bearing of 293 degrees. They carried out the bombardment of Dwarka around midnight, with each ship contributing to the firepower (Khan & Abbasi, 2012). In the underwater domain, the submarine PNS Ghazi played a crucial role. Deployed to the Bombay area on September 2, it reached its operational station by September 5. On the evening of September 22, the submarine detected persistent sonar contacts and launched an attack on what was identified as an Indian anti-aircraft frigate. At 1912 hours, four torpedoes were fired, resulting in two confirmed hits. Despite facing retaliatory anti-submarine warfare efforts, the submarine successfully evaded detection and returned safely to Karachi on September 23 (Hassan, 2024).

The increasing influence of the United States strengthened the naval capabilities of Pakistan in 1965 with additional equipment from the U.S. military, including five destroyers, eight minesweepers, and modern Scorpene-type submarines. Indonesia also contributed to Pakistan as they sent two submarines and two missile boats and threatened the Andaman and Nicobar Islands of the Indian side. Pakistan Navy used to raid the Indian Gujarat coast, including Dwarka, with no paying back by the Indian side as they had a defense limit during the war. The submarine PNS Ghazi of Pakistan had erroneously reported sinking an Indian frigate that got gallantry awards, which were proved untrue by India. The lack of role of the Indian Navy because of political choice enabled this kind of action to take place without significant repercussions to Pakistan, even though there was nothing really strategic about it. It was later to inspire India to assume a more offensive approach towards the naval strategy in the 1971 war. (Cardozo, 2024) As a proactive and defensive measure, the Pakistan Navy was protecting the maritime interests and preventing the aggression of India on the coastal border. According to ISPR briefing, Pakistan

Navy had been always alert and had all the time secured the maritime security of the nation by having a working deterrence at sea. This is an aspect of demonstrating that the Naval Forces are always ready to be deployed anywhere at any time and the ability to discourage escalation by displaying military preparation along with the Arabian Sea. (DGISPR, 2025). The DG ISPR also pointed out that the Navy worked alongside all the other arms of the military with full coordination. Some of the areas that have been addressed include the work done by the Pakistan Navy in collaboration with the Pakistan Air Force and Army in denying the advantage earned by the enemy in the maritime domain. This coordination represents a major shift in history in terms of how past conflicts were handled, which implies better joint operations and joint cooperation in real-time strategic response.

Conclusion

In 1965 the impact of information warfare was very limited because of media censorship as compare to 2025, even though Pakistan and India both doesn't have any direct psychological warfare units, if we come towards media narrative the impact of media was very less in 1965 as compare to 2025 as there was media censorship at that time while in 2025 it became multifaceted the media of both sides had exclusively covered the four day conflict even though there was spread of fake information, the fabricated breaking news of claiming victory which led to panic among masses.

In 1965, most Pakistanis and Indians they have follow the war through government radio and newspapers but only the official data, it was slow one-way stream of information which shaped by government announcements. But what we have seen in 2025 that every screen turned into battlefield. The news spread through social media platforms like X, WhatsApp, Facebook and YouTube, we have seen rise of AI manipulated clips and fake videos, this instant deluge of propaganda is a far cry from the measured official information of 1965.

In current digital era of electronic or information warfare the main goal is to manipulate public opinion and to turn it into a war of perceptions as there is a saying deception itself is a weapon. There was an observation from International Federation of journalists that during the four-day conflict the videos and images were misused, the emergence of deep fake AI generated images and videos blurred the line between fiction and reality. The comparison of 1965 and 2025 conflict is a stark contrast between analog era news bulletins slow impact with fastest digital impact on public perception now. This tells us that the battle of truth is as important as the ground battle. Although Kashmir and regional domination are still central to the conflict themes of 1965 and 2025, there has been a significant shift in both India's and Pakistan's political behavior. Pakistan's military autocracy and internal power struggles caused political unrest and strategic errors in 1965. India, on the other hand, was able to manage war decisively because of its democratic consistency. Both countries' political systems were more formalized and globally conscious in 2025. However, India emerged as the more confident actor, balancing nationalism with strategic restraint, while Pakistan struggled to align civil and military narratives in a globalized, economically constrained world.

On the other hand, operation Gibraltar was a covert mission aimed to capture Kashmir while, operation Grand Slam was a more conventional military offensive with a clear strategic goal. In 1965, Pakistan was experiencing robust GDP and industrial growth, strong agriculture, strong state-led industrialization, and adequate foreign aid to withstand post-war shock. In contrast, by 2025, the economy was grappling with slower GDP and industrial growth, weak agriculture, and reforms driven by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which is not sustainable to withstand post-war shocks, especially in cases of prolonged conflict. During the 1965 conflict, Pakistan faced a sudden halt in foreign aid and major disruptions in trade. However, in 2025, while the country continued to receive external financing, it dealt with challenges such as energy shortages and cyberattacks.

After the conflicts, recovery in 1965 was sluggish due to aid embargoes and losses in industry. In 2025, though, the economy rebounded more quickly by the support of ongoing development planning under IMF guidance, even as it continued to face pressures related to energy, food and currency. While Pakistan has made effort to diversify the economy and integrate with global markets, which helped to speed up the recovery, but Pakistan is still vulnerable to external shock, especially with regards to macroeconomic stability, energy security and cyber resilience. The Pakistan Navy's participation in both the Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and the 2025 scenario shows a very radical shift in terms of the strategic outlook, area of operation, and capability of inter-service coordination. The contributing role played by the Navy in 1965 was largely symbolic, but it had certain aspects of offensive attacks, such as the bombardment of Dwarka, the positioning of PNS Ghazi, which was strategically placed to prevent the movement of the Indian Navy and also to signify the extent of the Pakistani Maritime Zone despite being numerically outmatched. They were very much unilateral operations, and the joint-force, living or air-sea strategy was minimal. Conversely, the Pakistan Navy took on a much smarter and seamless role in the 2025 war by being the deterrence and maritime domain awareness voice, enabling them to work closely in a coordinated action with the Army and the Air Force. By 2025, the focus was on real-time joint operations, positioning, and being able to monitor the enemy so that he is not able to gain advantage, with the doctrinal change now being based on something multidimensional rather than isolated offensive hits. It is a way in which the Navy will transform into a strategic pillar that is fully operational by 2025, as opposed to a tactical support unit like it was in 1965.

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