The Institutional Paralysis in Asymmetric Conflict: Testing Neoliberal Institutionalism Through The Gaza Crisis

Abstract

International institutions are usually regarded as the instruments that can be used to control conflict, enforce the international law, and safeguard civilians. According to Neoliberal Institutionalism, state behavior can be restrained, and humanitarian damage can be reduced through rules, norms, and interaction between institutions. These assumptions are critical in the Gaza crisis. International law adherence was extremely low and even with the existence of political, legal, and humanitarian institutions, there were still massive civilian sufferings. This research paper reviews the work of international institutions in the Gaza crisis to determine the disparity between the mandate of the institutions and empirical results. The study examines the roles of the United Nations Security Council, international legal institutions and humanitarian agencies using a qualitative analysis, which is informed by secondary data, which includes institutional reports, legal proceedings, and scholarly sources. The results indicate a tendency of institutional engagement that has not been enforced influenced by political paralysis, power asymmetry as well as geopolitical interests. Institutions were still functionally alive but substantively dead in changing the conflict dynamics or protecting civilians. The paper proves that institutional efficiency is very conditional and limited in asymmetric conflict. The Gaza case underscores the constraints of the neoliberal institutionalist expectations and more generally the issue of the ability of world governing frameworks to limit conflicts in circumstances of power domination.

Keywords: Gaza Crisis, Neoliberal Institutionalism, Power Politics, UN, Security Council, Israel, Palestine