Minilateralism in Nuclear Governance: Functional Adaptation or Normative Fragmentation?

Abstract

This article examines the growing role of Minilateralism in contemporary nuclear governance and assesses whether it constitutes an effective adaptation to multilateral stagnation or a source of deeper regime fragmentation. While the global nuclear order remains formally anchored in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons, persistent legitimacy deficits, compliance asymmetries, and procedural paralysis have encouraged the rise of smaller, issue-specific coalitions. Using a qualitative comparative case study methodology, the article analyzes three prominent cases: the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and AUKUS. The study applies an integrated theoretical framework combining neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism to evaluate minilateralism through three analytical dimensions: power, efficiency, and legitimacy. Findings indicate that minilateral arrangements often outperform universal forums in terms of speed, targeted coordination, and technical problem-solving. However, these gains are frequently offset by selective participation, concentrated authority, and inconsistent norm application, which weaken perceptions of fairness and erode the coherence of the broader non-proliferation regime. The article argues that minilateralism is neither a replacement for multilateral nuclear governance nor a purely benign supplement. Rather, it is producing a hybrid governance order in which universal institutions retain symbolic legitimacy while smaller coalitions increasingly exercise operational authority. This transformation carries significant implications for strategic stability, norm durability, and the future architecture of global nuclear governance.

Keywords: Nuclear Governance; Non-Proliferation Regime; Regime Fragmentation; Strategic Competition; Global Nuclear Order; International Security